John Bolton
delivered 10 September 2018
[AUTHENTICITY CERTIFIED: Text version below transcribed directly from audio] Well, thank -- thank you very much, Gene [Eugene B. Meyer], for your kind introduction. I want to thank you as well as Dean Reuter for the invitation to be here today. It's a real honor. The Federalist Society's made an enormous difference in American law and the legal profession. As Gene mentioned, when I was in law school it was a pretty small crowd. In fact, at the time I was there Bob Bork was nominated to be Solicitor General by President Nixon. And Ralph Winter [ph] said, looking at -- at that nomination, that the first sentence in the New York Times story the next day morning should be: 'Yesterday, President Nixon appointed as his new Solicitor General 20% of all the conservatives at Yale Law School.'" So obviously times have changed, due in no small part to the -- to the Federalist Society. And I'm really grateful for this opportunity. I'm here to make a major announcement on U.S. policy toward the International Criminal Court, or ICC. After years of effort by self-styled "global governance" advocates, the ICC, a su[pr]anational tribunal that could supersede national sovereignties and directly prosecute individuals for alleged war crimes, was agreed [to] in 1998. For ICC proponents, this su[pr]anational, independent institution has always been critical to their efforts to overcome the perceived failure of nation-states, even those with strong constitutions, representative governments, and the rule of law. In theory, the ICC holds perpetrators of the most egregious atrocities accountable for their crimes, provides justice to the victims, and deters future abuses. In practice, however, the court has been ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed, outright dangerous. Moreover -- [breaks off to respond to ongoing verbal interruptions]. This is Code Pink, my friends who follow me around. So I -- I apologize for the background noise, but there we go. Moreover, the largely [un]spoken but always central aim of its most vigorous supporters was to constrain the United States. The objective was not limited to targeting individual U.S. service members, but rather America's senior political leadership, and its relentless determination to keep our country secure.
The ICC was formally established in July 2002, following the entry into force of
the
Rome Statute. In May 2002, however, President George W. Bush
authorized the
United States
to "un-sign" the Rome Statute because it was fundamentally illegitimate. The ICC
and its prosecutor had been granted potentially enormous, essentially
unaccountable powers, In no uncertain terms, the ICC was created as a free-wheeling global organization claiming jurisdiction over individuals without their consent. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC has authority to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression. It claims "automatic jurisdiction," meaning that it can prosecute individuals even if their own governments have not recognized, signed, or ratified the treaty. Thus, American soldiers, politicians, civil servants, private citizens, and even all of you sitting in this room today, are purportedly subject to the court's prosecution should a party to the Rome Statute or the chief prosecutor suspect you of committing a crime within a state or territory that has joined the treaty. To protect American service members from the ICC, in 2002 Congress passed the American Service-Members' Protection Act, or ASPA, which at the time some dubbed the "The Hague Invasion Act." This law, which enjoyed broad bipartisan support, authorizes the President to use all means necessary and appropriate, including force, to shield our service members and the armed forces of our allies from ICC prosecution. It also prohibits several forms of cooperation between the United States and the court. I was honored to lead the U.S. efforts internationally to protect Americans from the court's unacceptable overreach, starting with un-signing the Rome Statute. At President Bush's direction, we next launched a global diplomatic campaign to protect Americans from being handed over to the ICC. We negotiated over a hundred binding, bilateral agreements to prevent other countries from delivering U.S. personnel to the ICC. It remains one of my proudest achievements. Unfortunately, we were unable to reach agreement with every nation in the world, particularly those in the European Union, where the global governance dogma is strong. And last fall, our worst predictions about the ICC's professed and overbroad prosecutorial powers were confirmed.
In November of 2017, the ICC prosecutor requested authorization to investigate alleged war crimes committed by U.S. service members and intelligence professionals during the war in Afghanistan -- an investigation neither Afghanistan nor any other state party to the Rome Statute requested. Literally any day now, the ICC may announce the start of a formal investigation against these American patriots, who voluntarily signed on to go into harm's way to protect our nation, our homes, and our families in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The ICC prosecutor has requested to investigate these Americans for alleged detainee abuse, and perhaps more -- an utterly unfounded, unjustifiable investigation. Today, on the eve of September the 11th, I want to deliver a clear and unambiguous message on behalf of the President of the United States. The United States will use any means necessary to protect our citizens and those of our allies from unjust prosecution by this illegitimate court. We will not cooperate with the ICC.
We will let the ICC die on its own. After all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us. The United States bases this policy on five principal concerns about the court, its purported authority, and its effectiveness. First, the International Criminal Court unacceptably threatens American sovereignty and U.S. national security interests. The prosecutor in -- The prosecutor in The Hague1 claims essentially unfettered discretion to investigate, charge, and prosecute individuals, regardless of whether their countries have acceded to the Rome Statute. The court in no way derives these powers from any grant of consent by non-parties to the [Rome] Statute. Instead, the ICC is an unprecedented effort to vest power in a su[pra]national body without the consent of either nation-states or the individuals over which it purports to exert jurisdiction. It certainly has no consent what[soever] from the United States. As Americans, we fully understand that consent of the governed is a prerequisite to true legitimacy, and we reject such a flagrant violation of our national sovereignty. To make matters worse, the court's structure is contrary to fundamental American principles, including checks and balances on authority through the separation of powers. Our Founders believed that a division of authority among three separate branches of government would provide the maximum level of protection for individual liberty. The International Criminal Court, however, melds two of these branches together: the judicial and the executive. In the ICC structure, the executive branch -- the Office of the Prosecutor -- is an organ of the court. The framers of our constitution considered such a melding of powers unacceptable for our own government, and we should certainly not accept it in the ICC. Other governments may choose systems which reject the separation of powers, but not the United States. There are no adequate mechanisms to hold the court and its personnel accountable or curtail its unchecked powers when required. ICC proponents argue that corrupt or ineffective judges can be removed by a two-thirds vote of parties to the Rome Statute and that a prosecutor can be removed by a majority vote. However, I ask everyone in this room today: Would you consign the fate of American citizens to a committee of other nations, including Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and entities that are not even states, like the Palestinian Authority? You would not. I would not. And this Administration will not.
The ICC's
Assembly of States Part[ies] cannot supervise the court any more than
the United Nations General Assembly can supervise the UN bureaucracy. Recent allegations of mismanagement and corruption among ICC personnel make this
perfectly clear. The
first prosecutor elected by the Assembly of States Parties
attempted to
protect a high-ranking government official from prosecution, assisted a
businessman with links to violations in Libya, and shared confidential court
documents with Angelina In short, the International Criminal Court unacceptably concentrates power in the hands of an unchecked executive who is accountable to no one. It claims authority separate from and above the Constitution of the United States. It is antithetical to our nation's ideals. Indeed, this organization is the Founders' worst nightmare come to life: an elegant office building in a faraway country that determines the guilt or innocence of American citizens. Second, the International Criminal Court claims jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions, exacerbating the court's unfettered powers. The definitions of crimes, especially crimes of aggression, are vague and subject to wide-ranging interpretation by the ICC. Had the ICC existed during the Second World War, America's enemies would no doubt be eager to find the United States and its allies culpable for war crimes for the bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan. The (quote) "crime of aggression" could become a pretext for politically motivated investigations. Was the mission of U.S. Navy SEALs that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan a crime of aggression? What about the U.S. and coalition airstrikes in Syria to protect innocent children from chemical weapons? How about U.S. military exercises with allies and partners around the world? Or Israel's actions to defend itself on countless occasions? In the years ahead, the court is likely only to further expand its jurisdiction to prosecute ambiguously defined crimes. In fact, a side event at the Assembly of States Parties recently [in]cluded a panel discussion on the possibility of adding "ecocide," environmental and climate-related crimes, to the list of offenses within the court's jurisdiction. And here we come directly to the unspoken but powerful agenda of the ICC's supporters: the hope that its essentially political nature, in defining crimes such as "aggression," will intimidate U.S. decision-makers and others in democratic societies. As we know, the ICC already claims authority over crimes committed in States Parties, even if the accused are not from nations that have acquiesced to the Rome Statute. The next obvious st[ep] is to claim complete, universal jurisdiction: the ability to prosecute anyone, anywhere for vague crimes identified by The Hague's bureaucrats. Third, the International Criminal Court fails in its fundamental objective to deter and punish atrocity crimes. Since its inception in 2002, the court has spent over 1.5 billion dollars while attaining only eight convictions. This dismal record is hardly a deterrent to dictators and despots determined to commit horrific atrocities. In fact, despite ongoing ICC investigations, atrocities continue to occur in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and many other nations. The hard men of history are not deterred by fantasies of international law such as the ICC. The idea that faraway bureaucrats and robed judges would strike fear into the hearts of the likes of Saddam Hussein, Hitler, Stalin, and Gaddafi is preposterous, even cruel. Time and again, history has proven that the only deterrent to evil and atrocity is what Franklin Roosevelt once called "the righteous might"2 of the United States and its allies -- a power that, perversely, could be threatened by the ICC's vague definition of aggression crimes. Thus, we see, paradoxically, that the dangers of the International Criminal Court stem from both its potential strength and its manifest weakness.
Fourth, the International Criminal Court is superfluous, given that domestic
U.S. judicial systems already hold American citizens to the highest legal and
ethical standards. U.S.
service members in the field must operate fully in accordance with the laws of
armed conflict. When violations of law do occur, the United States takes
appropriate and swift ICC proponents argue that robust domestic judicial systems are fully consistent with the court because of the so-called complementarity principle. According to its supporters, the ICC functions only as a "court of last resort." If nations have taken appropriate steps to prosecute perpetrators of crime, the ICC will take no further action -- they say. And yet, there is little precedent for the ICC to determine how to apply the complementarity principle. How is the ICC prosecutor to judge when the principle has been met? Under what circumstances will the ICC be satisfied? How much sensitive documentation would the ever-toiling bureaucrats in The Hague demand from a sovereign government? And here's the key question: Who has the last word? If it's the ICC, the United States would manifestly be subordinated to the court. That is unacceptable. If the ICC prosecutor were to take the complementarity principle seriously, the court would never pursue an investigation against American citizens, because we know that the U.S. judicial system is more vigorous, more fair, and more effective than the ICC. The ICC prosecutor's November 20[17] request that I mentioned a moment ago, of course, proves that this notion, and thus the principle of complementarity, is completely farcical. The ICC prosecutor will pursue what investigations he chooses to pursue, based upon his own political motives, and without any serious application of the complementarity principle. Fifth, the International Criminal Court's authority has been sharply criticized and rejected by most of the world. Today, more than 70 nations, representing two-thirds of the world's population, and over 70 percent of the world's armed forces, are not members of the ICC. Several African nations have recently withdrawn or threatened to withdraw their membership, citing the disproportionate number of arrest warrants against Africans. To them, the ICC is just the latest European neo-colonial enterprise to infringe upon their sovereign rights. Israel too has sharply criticized the ICC. While the court welcomes the membership of the so-called "State of Palestine," it has threatened Israel -- a liberal, democratic nation -- with investigation into its actions in the West Bank and Gaza to defend its citizens from terrorist attacks. There has also been a suggestion that the ICC will investigate Israeli construction of housing projects on the West Bank. The United States will always stand with our friend and ally, Israel. And today, reflecting congressional concern with Palestinian attempts to prompt an ICC investigation of Israel, the Department of State will announce the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office here in Washington, DC. As President [Ronald] Reagan recognized in this context, the Executive has "the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain,"3 and the Trump Administration will not keep the office open when the Palestinians refuse to take steps to start direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel. The United States supports a direct and robust peace process, and we will not allow the ICC, or any other organization, to constrain Israel's right to self-defense. In sum, an international court so deeply divisive and so deeply flawed can have no legitimate claim to jurisdiction over the citizens of sovereign nations that have rejected its authority. Americans can rest assured that the United States will not provide any form of legitimacy or support to the court. We will not cooperate, engage, fund, or assist the ICC in any way. The President will not allow American citizens to be prosecuted by foreign bureaucrats, and he will not allow other nations to dictate our means of self-defense. We take this position not because we oppose justice for the victims of atrocities, but because we believe that perpetrators should face legitimate, effective, and accountable prosecution for their crimes, by sovereign national governments. In April of 2016, it was right here at the Mayflower Hotel, that President Trump gave his first major foreign policy address during his campaign. At that time, candidate Trump promised he would (quote) "always put the interests of the American people and American security above all else."4 Today, it is fitting that we reassert this fundamental promise within these walls. This afternoon, we also make a new pledge to the American people: If the court comes after us, Israel, or other U.S. allies, we will not sit quietly. We will take the following steps, among others, in accordance with the American Servicemembers' Protection Act and our other legal authorities: [1] We will negotiate even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit nations from surrendering U.S. persons to the ICC. And we will ensure that those we have already entered are honored by our counterpart governments. [2] We will respond against the ICC and its personnel to the extent permitted by U.S. law. We will ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United States. We will sanction their funds in the U.S. financial system, and we will prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system.
[3] We will do the same for any company or state that
assists an ICC [4] We will take note if any countries cooperate with ICC investigations of the United States and its allies, and we will remember that cooperation when setting U.S. foreign assistance, military assistance, and intelligence sharing levels. [5] We will consider taking steps in the UN Security Council to constrain the court's sweeping powers, including ensuring that the ICC does not exercise jurisdiction over Americans and the nationals of our allies that have not ratified the Rome Statute. This Administration will fight back to protect American constitutionalism, our sovereignty, and our citizens. No committee of foreign nations will tell us how to govern ourselves and defend our freedom. We will stand up for the U.S. Constitution abroad, just as we do at home. And, as always, in every decision we make, we will put the interests of the American people first. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Boy, I hope that's clear to everybody. Q & A
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
BOLTON: Sir. And -- And of course, that raises the question of to what extent the ICC prosecution could also pursue U.S. nationals for aiding and abetting conduct by the Afghan government forces, other forces in Afghanistan. And you look to a case like Colombia, for example, where government forces are credibly alleged to have conducted crimes themselves. Of course, this brings into the purview of the ICC, for example, President Bush or President Obama, who as a matter of public policy provided material support to those -- NSA BOLTON: I -- I know there's a question in here somewhere. I'm...sure it's coming. QUESTION: Right. My -- My question is, in all your remarks historically, you have considered U.S. nationals generically, but not to the same extent. And then you focused on Afghanistan. But there are all these conflicts around the world where the United States provides material supports [sic] to parties to -- to those conflicts. Are you -- Do you consider all those conflicts as well, or just what you hear coming out of the ICC as to what it's investigating? NSA BOLTON: I...consider that all Americans operating in the service of the government are subject to American law. And I would put our record of maintaining adherence to the rule of law, to the rule of...laws of armed conflict and anything else that's applicable, I'd put it up in comparison to any other country in the world. The reason I focused on Afghanistan today is that is the case that's closest to the ICC for the first time formally opening an investigation. But to me, the issue here is the legitimacy of the court in second-guessing American decisions on our own rule of law and how we enforce it. And that applies whatever the venue is. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Very welcome statement. We have heard over the years about warrants coming from the ICC against American leaders like Donald Rumsfeld and potentially Henry Kissinger and others. I wonder if you could bring us up to date a little on the status of where these things are. And also, is there anything in particular that is giving rise to making this statement today? NSA BOLTON: Right. Well, on the -- on the second point, as I said, the -- the court itself has informed us that the prosecutor has requested the court -- part of the problem of not having separation of powers -- to open a formal investigation. And we just wanted to make it clear to the ICC how we feel about that, which is not much, especially after eight years of the Obama Administration. And so that -- that really is -- is what dictated the timing here; although it's no coincidence tomorrow is September the 11th, which is how -- how this conflict in Afghanistan for us started. You know, there was a time, and I think it's...likely to come again, when a lot of countries thought that by adopting what they called "universal jurisdiction statutes," they could prosecute pretty much anybody they wanted any time. Belgium, for example, 20 or so years ago passed such a universal jurisdiction statute and they were -- they were going to serve a warrant, as I recall, on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld when he showed up in Brussels for a NATO conference. And he reminded them that it wasn't graven in tablets of stone that NATO's headquarters was in Brussels, so if they tried it, see what would happen next. And amazingly, they rethought the idea and never served him with a warrant. But it's preposterous to think that these ideas, many of which are embodied in -- in the Rome Statute and -- and the ICC, can be allowed to take effect and bind Americans. And the ICC is a -- a much-prized institution by many people around the world who have larger aspirations in the field of global governance, which I think is -- I think in -- in time and time again, we find antithetical to the U.S. Constitution, and it's important to stand up and say it as clearly as we know how to do that just speaking in secular terms here -- I don't -- I don't want to speak in, to be heard to be speaking in religious terms -- but in secular terms on this earth, we don't recognize any authority higher than the U.S. Constitution. Sir. QUESTION: Thanks for coming today, Ambassador. My question is, some of your critics, perhaps outside this room, might say this is typical of the Trump Administration's skepticism about multilateral, multinational organizations. And this is just another example. I wonder if, given the chance, how would you articulate a conservative vision -- and I've heard you do this before -- of multinational organizations that do respect sovereignty? And what do those look like? Can you give us what that ideal is? NSA BOLTON: Yeah. Well, I think collective defense organizations like NATO are an excellent example of a -- of an international organization that advances American interest, is consistent with American sovereignty, and strengthens America and its allies around the world. The difference is that there are some of these -- some institutions, some treaties that purport to create authorities and institutions outside of, beyond, above the Constitution that put themselves in a kind of continuing revision outside the power of the Senate and the Executive Branch. I think that's particularly true of treaties that create judicial institutions. But -- But many, many treaties that we see have conventions of state parties; they get together every five years; they pass declarations. They're in effect reinterpreting the treaties, putting new obligations on states' parties. Those never come back to the Senate for ratification. And I think this is something that, frankly, deserves more attention in the Senate than it gets. There...are some institutions, the European Union in particular, that are founded on the notion that the nation state was a failure. And to create institutions above the nation state, that's what they've been in the process of doing. God bless them. It's their democratic choice to do it if that's what they want. And God bless the people of Great Britain who two years ago voted to get out of the European Union. Yes, sir. QUESTION: Yes, sir, my name is Kami, but I'm with the Pakistani Spectator, and you mentioned about Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan. And given we have troops in Afghanistan, it's still important part of the U.S. foreign policy. So do you, in -- in the light of Afghanistan and our foreign policy, object in Afghanistan, do you see that the election of this guy, Imran Khan, is an opportunity for America or he is an obstacle, given he is the most pro-Western guy we could find in that part of the world? He was raised up partially in England. And if you think this is -- his election is an opportunity, do you think that we should return Pakistan's $300 million that they have already spent helping us to control Afghan border? Thank you very much. NSA BOLTON: Well, you know, Secretary of State Pompeo was just in Pakistan. He didn't meet with Imran Khan, but he did -- he did meet with a number of his counterparts. QUESTION:: Oh, he met Imran Khan. NSA BOLTON: And he wanted to -- he wanted to convey the message that -- that we hoped and expected that Pakistan would cooperate fully in the war against terrorism which they had committed to do. It was before my time, but the Trump Administration did not take the decision to cancel a substantial part of the military aid package to Pakistan lightly. It was done knowing full well that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state and that the risk that the government could fall into the hands of terrorists that would get control of those nuclear weapons was particularly serious. But it's a serious problem on the subcontinent, and I hope it's one that the new government of Pakistan addresses because this terrorist threat is a threat, I think, to the majority opinion of the people in Pakistan, not to the terrorists and not to some of their supporters in the military and elsewhere. But it's a matter of extraordinary importance to the United States and one that we hope the new government addresses. QUESTION: Ambassador Bolton, thank you so much for being here. I'm president of the Federalist Society at my law student chapter. And first, I just wanted to say thank you for upholding the justice system in this country that I hope to be a part of in just shy of two years. My question for you is, does the U.S. consider the previous convictions by the ICC to be invalid? And if so, do you need -- do you believe there's a need to relitigate these issues in a legitimate sovereign nation? NSA BOLTON: Well, I think for those countries that decide they want to be a party to the Rome Statute, that's their choice. It's not a choice I'd agree with. I think whenever you're dealing with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and these kinds of atrocities, gross abuses of human rights, you have to look at the circumstances in each country to decide what the right way to proceed is. There are some countries that made conscious decisions that they would not follow a prosecutorial model in South Africa -- for example, after the fall of the apartheid government, Nelson Mandela, over the objections of many people in the African National Congress, thought that the best way to unite all of South Africa was -- was through creating what they eventually called the "Truth and Reconciliation" process, so that there would be an incentive for people who committed gross abuses of human rights under apartheid to come forward, confess fully, and be absolved of the crimes they committed. You can debate the merits of that proposition. It's obviously a complex issue, but it was Mandela's feeling that that was better than prosecution. Many of the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, after being liberated from communism, tried to decide how they would bring their societies back from the misshapen form they had taken under communism, how -- how they would approach this question of collaboration with communists and the communist network of informants through decades of communist rule. And most of them came to the conclusion that prosecution was not the right way. On the other hand, where you have circumstances where prosecution is warranted or deemed desirable, I think honestly it should be the government of the country in question that -- that undertakes the prosecutions. Now, there are two objections to that. One is, "Well, they'll never do it and be fair." And my response to that is, you don't know that necessarily. You don't know when it might be appropriate to do it. And besides, if you take the decision out of their hands, as with the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, you're interfering in the political maturation process of the people involved. You don't bring political maturity to people by taking hard decisions away from them. I think that, in fact, runs the risk of sowing the possibility of future discord. But ultimately, a mature society that's going to stay together has to be willing to make prosecutorial decisions. And the idea that a group of elders, you know, wiser people, will make this decision for them, around the world, wherever it might be, is not simply terribly patronizing. I think it's utterly unsound from a -- from a self-government point of view. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Yes, I read a couple of days ago there's unsubstantiated claims by the Russians that our government used white phosphorus in Syria. And there's also been other unsubstantiated claims that Syria's used chemical weapons. Some also claim it's Saudi Arabia. And I think it's been pretty well acknowledged that Israel used white phosphorus. And who exactly would prosecute any of these governments if they did these things? And as on a completely unrelated question, if we do -- do really want to have national sovereignty, why is the United States still in as a member of the United Nations? NSA BOLTON:: Well, with respect to the second question: You know, Jean Kirkpatrick was once asked why the United States didn't withdraw from the United Nations. And she paused for a moment and thought and said, "because it's not worth the trouble." Own -- Only Jean could come up with an answer like that, I have to say. Look, I don't -- I don't think in -- in significant respects most of the UN system poses a sovereignty problem to the United States. I think there are aspects of the UN system that do pose sovereignty problems, such as the UN Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which is one reason that the United States recently withdrew from the Human Rights Council and will defund both the Council and the High Commissioner's Office. As long as we have the veto in the Security Council, and the veto can only be taken away by an amendment to the UN Charter, which requires the consent of the five permanent members, so I don't -- I don't think this is going to happen anytime soon. I don't -- I don't think it can do that kind of damage to us. It -- It does advance some American interests. It wastes a lot of American money. But I don't see the -- the UN system as a whole -- we'd have to look at specific cases. I don't see that as a sovereignty threat. That's why I thought the ICC was very different than the UN, which was always imagined as an organization of sovereign governments. That's basic to the charter. To be admitted to the UN, you have to be a State, which is one reason why the Palestinian Authority should never have been allowed to accede to the Rome Statute or join any UN body like it was allowed to join UNESCO. With respect to the question of chemical weapons in Syria, the response of the Trump Administration when we had unmistakable proof twice, once in April of 2017 and once in April of this year [2018], was to use force against the Syrian regime because of the use of a weapon of mass destruction that the Trump Administration found unacceptable. We've tried to convey the message in recent days that if there's a third use of chemical weapons, the response will be much stronger. And I can say we've been in consultation with the British and the French, who joined us in the second strike. And they also agree that another use of chemical weapons will result in a much stronger response. Now, in part, in response, I think the government of Russia and others have said that we are giving the authorization for Al-Qaeda to use chemical weapons and try and pin it on the government of Syria. That has to be in the -- in the history of propaganda in the 20th and 21st centuries, one of the most outrageous claims that -- that I can think of. This is something that we take very seriously and, you know, ultimately if Syria is put back together, this is the perfect kind of example of a case where the people of Syria themselves are going to have to confront what governments did -- what their government did purportedly in their name. I'm not sure anybody's ever going to be able to find the perpetrators. Battlefields are not crime investigation scenes. But that reality is out there. It's very unpleasant and amazingly it happens with no deterrent effect at all from the ICC. It's just a further demonstration that the idea that the ICC would deter commission of these heinous crimes has been proven utterly false, as was in entirely predictable at the outset. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Hello, I'm Kimberly Reed, President Trump's nominee to be President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States. NSA BOLTON: Congratulations. QUESTION: Not there yet. Almost. So, the President's National Security Strategy, Pillar 2, is promoting American prosperity. And I'd just love to get an update from you on your focus on that. NSA BOLTON: Well, we spend a lot of time looking at abuses of the international free trade system. You know, I think there's a lot of misunderstanding in the press as to how the President feels about this. I -- I was there in Canada at the G7 meeting when he said to the other G7 members, what we really ought to talk about here is a system with no tariffs, no subsidies, and no artificial barriers to trade. And they -- they all nodded and said, "Yeah, that -- that sounds right." And then they wanted to go and talk about something else. That's -- That's the objective that we ought to be aiming for. We shouldn't be under any illusion that just because a international trade agreement is called a "free trade agreement," it really is. It's a -- There's a series of managed trade agreements, many of which were badly negotiated on the part of the United States. The President's trying to fix them. He's trying to fix the abuses that China and other countries have undertaken in things like the World Trade Organization, what they've done in terms of stealing American and European intellectual property, forced technology transfers, discrimination against foreign businesses and investors and the like. It's -- It's very complex, but -- but it's central, I think, to the President's view, which, I think, is unquestionably correct -- that you cannot have a strong American presence in the world without a strong American domestic economy, and you can't have a strong domestic economy without a strong presence in the world. So, that's why the questions that we debate domestically about our economy are so important for strategic -- the strategic ability of the United States to protect its interests around the world. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Ambassador Bolton. Thank you. My name is [unclear] from Voice of America. Completely unrelated questions. I have a questions on North Korea. North Korea celebrated its 70th anniversary over the weekend, but they didn't show -- they didn't display the ICBMs. But there are new Intel reports that North Korea putting more efforts to hide their nuclear facilities. I was curious how you [can sell?] that. And also where we -- could you help us understand what specifically next step are we waiting for North Korea to take and then where we are at with the negotiation with North Korea. NSA BOLTON: Well, I think the -- the best way to put it is that in meeting with Kim Jong Un in Singapore a few months ago, President Trump tried to hold the door open to Kim Jong Un and his regime. If they would denuclearize, as they committed to do in Singapore, they could have a very different kind of life in North Korea. Kim Jong Un had committed in April to South Korean President Moon Jae-in that he would denuclearize. He committed to do it quickly. He said, "We can do it in two years." Moon Jae-in said to Kim Jong Un, and President Moon told this to President Trump, Moon Jae-in said, "Well, why don't we do it in one year?" Kim Jong Un said, "We'll do it in one year." So that's where the one-year timetable comes from from -- for those who are truly interested. I thought they could do it even more quickly than that, but one year is not bad. We're still waiting for them. Now, the possibility of another meeting between the two presidents obviously exists, but -- but President Trump can't make the North Koreans walk through the door he's holding open. They're the ones that have to take the steps to denuclearize, and that's what we're waiting for. Is there anybody else over here? Why don't we take one more over here? Yes, sir. QUESTION: Hello. So, my question is do you think the United States serve as a threat to other nations' constitution and sovereignty like China and North Korea? Thank you. NSA BOLTON: Do I think the United States is a threat to other nations' sovereignty? QUESTION: Under Constitution, yes. NSA BOLTON: No, I don't think we're a threat to anybody else's sovereignty. I -- I think -- I think it has been so important for the United States to appreciate the significance of a government that has the consent of its own people; that it has, in contrast to every other major power in world history that I'm aware of, has not sought permanent...empire all across the globe. After we expanded across the continent, that was pretty much it. That makes -- That's a demonstration of, if you will, American exceptionalism. And I think we're very conscious of the -- of the importance of sovereignty. We can't and don't attempt to control what other nations do. As I said before, if the European Union wants to dissolve national sovereignty in -- into the bureaucracy in Brussels, that's -- that's entirely their prerogative; and -- and others are free to do it as well. But we don't push anybody in that direction, and in fact, I think we're -- we're conscious of it even as we renegotiate a lot of the trade disputes that we're talking about today. There's no desire on our part for something akin to the European Union. And -- And with that, I appreciate again the opportunity to be with you. Thank you very much. 1 Wikipedia entry: "The Hague is known as the home of international law and arbitration. The International Court of Justice, the main judicial arm of the United Nations, is located in the city, as well as the International Criminal Court, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Europol, and approximately 200 other international governmental organisations." [Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hague] 2 FDR used the phrase in his Pearl Harbor address to the nation. Extended quotation: "No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion [by Japan], the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory." [emphasis added] 3 Extended quotation: "Section 1003 of the [Foreign Relations Authorization] Act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office ``to further the interests of'' the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President's authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the Act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision." [Source: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/122287e] 4 Extended quotation: "I’d like to talk today about how to develop a new foreign policy direction for our country, one that replaces randomness with purpose, ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace. It’s time to shake the rust off America’s foreign policy. It’s time to invite new voices and new visions into the fold, something we have to do. The direction I will outline today will also return us to a timeless principle. My foreign policy will always put the interests of the American people and American security above all else. It has to be first. Has to be." [emphasis added; source: https://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/]
See also: Shereshevsky's
scholarly analysis in the Journal of
International Criminal Justice
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