delivered 2 April 2019, Washington, D.C.
Today we are providing an update on the Presidentís Iran strategy. I will highlight the effects we are seeing on the Iranian regime and its allies and proxies in the Middle East. This briefing comes at a time when Iran is facing severe flooding. At least 45 people have died in the past two weeks after heavy rains, with flooding affecting at least 23 of Iranís 31 provinces. The Secretary issued a statement earlier today extending his condolences and offering assistance, and I extend my condolences as well.
Since taking office, the administration has designated over 970 Iranian entities and individuals. The sanctions announced last week against front companies supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iranís ministry of defense were the 26th round of American sanctions. Our sanctions have targeted a range of threats, especially Iranís support of terrorism, missile proliferation, its nuclear program, human rights abuses, and others.
As part of this pressure, we have sanctioned more than 70 Iran-linked financial institutions and their foreign and domestic subsidiaries. The SWIFT financial messaging system matched many of these designations and disconnected every sanctioned bank in Iran. In November, SWIFT even disconnected the Central Bank of Iran from its system. We have targeted Iranís illicit oil shipping networks, which enrich the brutal Assad regime and terrorist partners like Hezbollah.
We are taking unprecedented steps to deepen our cooperation with allies and partners to confront Iranian-backed terrorism and aggression. Joint teams from the departments of State and Treasury have now visited more than 50 countries around the world to brief on our new policy and warn of the dangers and reputational risks of doing business with Iran. Almost one year after the United States ended its participation in the Iran nuclear deal, and five months after the full reimposition of our sanctions, it is clear that our actions are restricting Iranís cash flow. They are constraining its ability to operate freely in the region.
Our oil sanctions have taken approximately 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil exports off the market since May of 2018. This has denied the regime access to well over $10 billion in revenue. That is a loss of at least $30 million a day, and this is only with respect to the oil. Iran would otherwise use this money to support its destructive and destabilizing activities. Because of our efforts, the regime now has less money to spend on its support of terrorism, missile proliferation, and on its long list of proxies. In November, we granted eight waivers, oil waivers to avoid a spike in the price of oil. I can confirm today that three of those importers are now at zero. That brings us to a total of 23 importers that once were purchasers of Iranian crude that are now at zero. With oil prices actually lower than they were when we announced our sanctions, and global oil -- and global production stable, we are on the fast track to zeroing out all purchases of Iranian crude.
More than 100 major corporations withdrew from business in Iran. Companies like Total and Siemens have exited the Iranian market, taking with them billions of dollars in investment. Since the IRGC controls up to half of Iranís economy, this lack of investment means less money for the Quds Force and Iranís network of proxies. Our sanctions are draining Iranís support to its proxies, and for the first time in a very long time, they have less access to revenue to spread terror and militancy. In March, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, publicly appealed for donations for the first time ever. He has been forced to undertake unprecedented austerity measures. There are reports that some Hezbollah fighters are receiving half of their pay, and that others are only being paid $200 a month. Other Hezbollah employees report receiving 60 percent of their normal monthly salaries.
A new analysis released last month by the Washington Institute corroborates these findings. Hezbollah has closed almost a thousand offices and paused hiring of new personnel. The report further concludes that Hezbollah itself attributes this belt-tightening to U.S. sanctions on Iran, which has historically provided the group with $700 million annually. That is 70 percent of Hezbollah's entire budget.
Hezbollah is not alone in feeling the strain of American sanctions. Iranian proxies in Syria and elsewhere are experiencing a lack of funding from Tehran. Fighters are going unpaid, and the services they once relied upon are drying up. Last week The New York Times quoted a Shia fighter in Syria who said that, quote, ďThe golden days are gone and will never return. Iran doesnít have enough money to give us.Ē
We are working with our allies and partners to make this the new norm. We have acted with them to disrupt Iranís illicit oil shipping operations. When we identified ships smuggling illicit Iranian oil for the Quds Force to support Hezbollah and the Assad regime, Secretary Pompeo dispatched diplomatic teams to work with our allies and partners to help prevent it. We have been working with countries on almost every continent to identify vessels of concern and disrupt their operations. More than 75 vessels involved in illicit activity have been denied the flags that they need to sail.
Panama issued a presidential decree to pull registration and de-flag Iranian vessels. Countries like Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone have exercised great diligence to disrupt these schemes and deny criminal Iranian entities access to flag registries, insurance, and classification. We thank each of these nations for their work.
America has not acted alone to counter Iranís malign behavior. Our European partners pushed back against Iran after a foiled bomb plot in Paris, and thwarted an assassination attempt in Denmark. In January, the European Union sanctioned Iranís ministry of intelligence and security and two of its agents for their roles in these activities. The EUís recent Foreign Affairs Council passed conclusions in February that called out its ballistic -- Iranís ballistic missile program. It also opposed Iranís malign activity in Europe, as well as its ongoing role in regional conflicts. Many European countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Albania, and Serbia have acted to address the threat of Iranian terrorism on their own soil, whether by recalling ambassadors, expelling Iranian diplomats, eliminating visa-free travel, or denying landing rights to Mahan Air, as Germany recently did. All of these activities were undertaken after the U.S. exited the Iran nuclear deal, undercutting the narrative that the U.S. is alone in countering Iranís threats to international peace and security.
We are also working with our allies and partners to oppose Iranís
ballistic missile program. The United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany have repeatedly highlighted Iranís defiance of UN
Security Council Resolution 2231, which calls upon Iran not to undertake
any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. We relayed our strong concerns to the UN
secretary-general following Iranís launch of a medium range ballistic
missile in December, and its attempted satellite launches in January and
This economic crisis is largely of the regimeís own making, because it
has prioritized expanding the revolution abroad over sound economics at
home. Living conditions have barely rebounded to pre-revolution levels.
For most Iranians, the promises of the revolution never materialized.
This is why the hashtag #40yearsoffailure was a popular hashtag inside
Iran during the regimeís 40th anniversary. Today there are reports that
indicate Iranís economy is in recession. The rial has lost two-thirds of
its value, the IMF predicts Iranís economy will contract by as much as
3.6 percent in 2019, and inflation hit a record 40 percent in November,
with inflation for goods at 60 percent. It is likely to be much higher
than that today, but it is difficult to know because the Central Bank of
Iran stopped publicly reporting inflation back in December. What is the
Iíve discussed at length how our pressure is depriving the Iranian regime of the resources it needs to sustain its tactical operations. I want to close briefly by discussing the broader strategic implications this has for the region. As we increase pressure, we are creating new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East.
First, our pressure is aimed at reversing Iranís strategic gains. From
roughly 2007 through 2016, Iran was able for a variety of reasons to
deepen its support of proxies and entrench itself in regional conflicts
without facing negative consequences. Iran does this by letting its
proxies do the dying for them in regional wars. The proxies also give
the regime plausible deniability, a 40-year fiction this administration
refuses to honor. Since taking office, but especially in the last 11
months, this administration has countered Iranís grand strategy. We are
imposing costs on the regime for behaving as an outlaw expansionist
regime. The regime is weaker today than when we took office two years
ago. Its proxies are also weaker. Unless the regime demonstrates a
change in policy and behavior, the financial challenges facing Tehran
The effects of Iranís meddling had been felt most sharply by the
regionís innocent civilians. Men, women, and children are casualties of
Iranís dangerous expansionism almost every day. In Yemen, Iran has
helped fuel a humanitarian catastrophe by backing the Houthis. Its
support has prolonged the conflict well beyond what makes any sense at
In Lebanon, the Iranian regimeís obsession with using Hezbollah to provoke conflict with Lebanonís neighbors threatens the safety of the Lebanese people. IRGC backing enables Hezbollah to use murder, terrorism, and corruption to intimidate other Lebanese parties and communities.
In Iraq, I can announce today, based on declassified U.S. military reports, that Iran is responsible for the deaths of at least 608 American service members. This accounts for 17 percent of all deaths of U.S. personnel in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. This death toll is in addition to the many thousands of Iraqis killed by the IRGCís proxies.
Third, rolling back Iranís power projection will make it easier to
address other regional challenges. Many intellectuals and diplomats over
the years have argued that without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, there can be no progress on other conflicts. This has been
referred to by some as linkage -- the idea that resolving peace between
Israel and the Palestinians was necessary to resolve other flash points.
When we look at the challenges in the region, from the peace process to conflicts in Syria and Yemen, to violence in Bahrain and Iraq, Iranís operations lie at or very near the heart of the problem. It supports Palestinian terror groups like Hamas that undermine the aspirations of the Palestinian people. It exports missiles and terrorist know-how to the Houthis in Yemen, who in turn threaten neighboring countries. It threatens the war -- it perpetuates the war in Syria by propping up the Assad regime. Nowhere in the region are peace and prosperity compatible with Iranian influence and support.
The Islamic Republic is linked to these crises in a way that compounds
suffering and prevents peace and stability from getting a better
footing. Iran can no longer be allowed to play the role of chief
spoiler. Our pressure is making it harder than ever before for them to
As we have done from the start, we will continue to call on all nations to join us in restoring the basic demands on Iran to behave like a peaceful nation. This include -- This includes ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons, stop testing and proliferating ballistic missiles, stop sponsoring terrorist proxies, and halt the arbitrary detention of dual citizens.
As Secretary Pompeo has said, we are prepared to end the principal components of every one of our sanctions against the regime. We are happy to re-establish full diplomatic and commercial ties with Iran. If Iran makes a fundamental shift, as outlined in the Secretaryís 12 demands, a lot of good things can happen between the people of Iran and the people of the United States. That includes supporting the modernization and reintegration of the Iranian economy into the international economic system.
Glad to take a few questions. Matt.
Question: Thank you. Are you going to be making an abridged version of this available?
Mr. Hook: There will be a fact sheet released after this.
Question: Okay. Thanks. Two things real quick. One, on the money, the 10 billion denied for destructive activities, is it not also the case that no matter how small the amount that Iran might spend, that 10 billion that youíve taken away from them could also have been used for things like infrastructure or for disaster relief if --
Mr. Hook: Iran had that opportunity back in 2013.
Question: Well, right. But itís 2019 now --
Mr. Hook: Right. But --
Question: -- and theyíre suffering from floods. So that --
Mr. Hook: They are suffering from floods because Iran has prioritized its expansionist foreign policy over things like emergency preparedness and water management. I released a video a few weeks ago, before the flooding occurred, talking about how Iran has destroyed its environment. The regime has destroyed its environment, and it has mismanaged its water resources, and it goes through these cycles of drought and flooding.
When this regime came to power, there were about seven ancient dams and 12 modern dams. Over the course of the last 40 years, this regime has built 600 dams. That is just water malpractice, water management malpractice.
Question: Okay. But, I mean, natural disasters happen everywhere. They happen here too. Itís not --
Mr. Hook: And so they have prioritized all of this -- they have prioritized this consistently. People are still recovering from the earthquake in 2017.
Question: Can I -- then just the last one briefly. You said on the oil waivers -- so you said three of the eight that were -- three of the eight are no longer necessary, the ones -- the original ones?
Mr. Hook: No, I said that three of the eight have gone to zero.
Question: Right. Well, so they donít need waivers then, right? So thereís five left?
Mr. Hook: Thatís correct.
Question: There is -- there are some people, quite a few actually, who make the argument that you should not give any more waivers, that everything should go to zero, zero means zero, maximum pressure.
Mr. Hook: Right.
Question: That concerns about the market and the supply are compensated for or made up for by the Saudis willingness to expand production to cover any -- so do you intend to not give any more -- to extend -- to not extend any of the waivers? Or is that still an open possibility?
Mr. Hook: Well, weíre still currently under the existing waivers that expire on May 2nd. There will be an announcement on that in due course. We are not looking to grant any exceptions to our campaign of maximum economic pressure. As Iíve said in my remarks and Iíve said in other forum, fora, that in 2018 we had a very tight and fragile oil market and the President did not want to lift the price of oil. We very, I think, carefully and correctly calibrated balancing our national security and economic objectives. 2019 is a much better picture in global oil markets. We forecast more supply than demand. And that creates much better conditions for us to accelerate our path to zero.
Question: Thank you.
Mr. Hook: Rich.
Question: Thanks, Brian. So if youíve taken off a million and a half a
day, youíre somewhere south of a million barrels a day? Thatís where --
Question: Is there a point -- and I know the intent is to get to zero, but is there a point that the administration sees as a real tipping point that -- is it half a million barrels or somewhere in between that really begins to drive the economic ramifications?
Mr. Hook: Well, we already are -- weíre doing that now at our current levels. So we have reached that goal of affecting Iranís -- disrupting and making it harder for Iran to sustain its foreign policy. So weíre -- this briefing was to talk about the impact. I often get this question -- what kind of impact are you seeing? -- so I thought itíd be useful to provide a comprehensive briefing on what weíre seeing and what others are seeing. And weíre just getting started.
Question: Thank you. Since Secretary Pompeo is hosting this event on captive Americans this afternoon, I wonder if you can tell us if thereís been any new effort by the administration to open up a humanitarian dialogue with Iran on the cases of Americans held there in Iran or if youíre considering anything punitive, specific sanctions to pressure Iran to release these people.
Mr. Hook: Well, Iíd refer you to -- I donít want to get in Robert
OíBrienís lane. I can tell you that when I did -- this was back when the
United States was in the Iran nuclear deal and I attended the last
meeting of the joint commission that the United States participated in.
I requested a meeting with Iranís deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi,
and I presented him the names of all the Americans who are being
arbitrarily detained. I asked for their release, asked for an update on
their condition, and suggested that we do some sort of -- that we start
opening the channel. Robert OíBrien has picked that up, and so we are --
heís going to be having some events this afternoon. Iím happy to put
Robert in touch with you to give you a more detailed answer.
Question: Brian, just two quick ones, one on the oil waivers. So if conditions on May 2nd are what they are today, would you say that conditions are right to bring that to zero? And then second, on the 608 American service members you identified as Iran having been responsible for their deaths, is that -- could you us give more detail on that? What was that classified information that was declassified? And you mentioned 2003 to 2011, so is that -- thatís the date frame, time frame for those Americans?
Mr. Hook: Yes. Thatís a Department of Defense statistic. Iím happy to give you more details on it but wanted to release that number.
Question: And on the waivers?
Mr. Hook: I already answered the waiver question.
Question: But not -- I mean, if today, given the -- what you mentioned about the oil market and the fact that it seems to be well supplied and oil prices are relatively low, would you feel comfortable bringing waivers to zero?
Mr. Hook: We -- because 2019 we forecast more supply than demand, there are better market conditions for us to accelerate our path to zero. We are not looking to grant any waivers or exceptions to our sanctions regime.
Last question for Abbie.
Question: Thank you. You went through a lot of the economic impact of what youíre seeing one year after from the sanctions. But what changes in behavior have you seen from Iran as far as their malign activities throughout the world that you have been pointing out for the last year?
Mr. Hook: Well, thatís what we wanted to highlight today. To some extent I feel like donít take my word for it; the Iranian regime is admitting it at the supreme leader level, the presidential -- the level of the president. Youíve seen the leader of Hezbollah make a public appeal for donations. Youíre seeing reporting in the New York Times front page on Friday last week chronicling how the combination of Iranís financial mismanagement plus American sanctions are impeding Iranís ability to fund its proxies and allies at the levels that they are accustomed to. And since Iran does supply Hezbollah with 70 percent of its revenue, it is quite significant when you have the leader of Hezbollah making a public appeal for money. Heís obviously not getting as much as he needs to execute his objectives because, as heís attributed to, American sanctions.
So we think itís very much interest -- in the interest of the Iranian people to join this effort of pressure, because we are seeing the results. And there were a lot of people who, when we got out of the deal, who were saying, ďOh, America alone, can you do this? This is going to be very hard without everybody joining you.Ē And I think that that has now been proven wrong. Weíre only five months into the re-imposition of our sanctions, and we are now already seeing these effects that are being reported by others, not by us.
And so we think, as I said, we share the same threat assessment with so many - with our -- with countries in the Middle East, with our European partners. When we were in Warsaw, we saw there -- one nice consequence of Iranís foreign policy is that it has brought together Arabs and Israelis in a way that we had not thought possible. And so you saw they have this common threat of Iranís foreign policy, its revolutionary foreign policy, and it is a very urgent matter. And so I remember Prime Minister Netanyahu saying in Warsaw when you see the Arabs and the Israelis agreeing as strongly as they do, you need to pay attention to that. Something very important is happening, and weíre seeing it. Weíve been seeing it for a while, and I just wanted to give you an update on what weíre seeing on the ground.
Original Text Source: State.gov
Original Audio, Video, Image (Screenshot) Source:
Audio Note: AR-XE = American Rhetoric Extreme Enhancement
Page Created: 5/17/19
Audio Note: AR-XE = American Rhetoric Extreme Enhancement
Page Created: 5/17/19
U.S. Copyright Status: Audio = Property of AmericanRhetoric.com. Text and Video = Public domain.